Dictum of the day, or on hard truths

Koji je to datum u savremenoj historiji koji ispunjava taj uvjet, a da ga svi prihvate kao takvog? Da ima simboliku zajedničkog sjećanja koje doprinosi jačanju kolektivnog identiteta? Pa sam kolektivni identitet je sporan u ovoj zemlji?! Koje je to zajedničko sjećanje koje ima zajedničku simboliku? Savremena historija ne nudi odgovor, daljnja historija ne nudi odgovor, daleka historija ne nudi odgovor?! Gorko ukazujem na to da bi se, možda, u vremenu ranog srednjeg vijeka našao takav datum, ali sumnjam, jer bi jednima smetalo, npr., krunisanje u pravoslavnom manastiru, drugima ljiljan kao iskaz katoličke vjernosti na zastavi, a trećima historijska činjenica ko je srušio tu tvorevinu ranog srednjeg vijeka!

Odluka o dopustivosti i meritumu Ustavnog suda BiH, br. U-3/13 od 26.11.2015., Izdvojeno mišljenje o neslaganju Zlatka M. Kneževića

Dictrum of the day, or on the nature of constitutions

Kad je riječ o zaštićenim ustavnim dobrima, Ustavu se ne može pristupati na način da se iz cjeline odnosa koji se njime ustrojavaju izvlači jedna odredba, pa se ona onda tumači zasebno i mehanički, neovisno o svim ostalim vrijednostima koje su Ustavom zaštićene. Ustav čini jedinstvenu cjelinu. On posjeduje unutarnje jedinstvo i značenje pojedinačnog dijela vezano je uz sve ostale odredbe. Promatra li ga se kao jedinstvo, Ustav odražava pojedina sveobuhvatna načela i temeljne odluke u vezi s kojima se moraju tumačiti sve njegove pojedinačne odredbe.

Judgment of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, U-VIIR-4640/2014, 12 August 2014, para. 10.  

Dictum of the day, or on the currency of rights

[T]he protection of a person’s fundamental human rights cannot be reduced to a question of currency. The right to self-determination, to respect for one’s bodily integrity and the right not to be ill treated are not commodities which can be ‘traded’. One should not have to pay to be left alone.

A.A. and Others v. Sweden, no. 14499/09, 28 June 2012, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Power-Forde

Dictum of the Day, or Who Protects Ospreys?

An individual may be personally affected in his private interests by the environmental issues to which an application for planning permission may give rise. Noise and disturbance to the visual amenity of his property are some obvious examples. But some environmental issues that can properly be raised by an individual are not of that character. Take, for example, the risk that a route used by an osprey as it moves to and from a favourite fishing loch will be impeded by the proposed erection across it of a cluster of wind turbines. Does the fact that this proposal cannot reasonably be said to affect any individual’s property rights or interests mean that it is not open to an individual to challenge the proposed development on this ground? That would seem to be contrary to the purpose of environmental law, which proceeds on the basis that the quality of the natural environment is of legitimate concern to everyone. The osprey has no means of taking that step on its own behalf, any more than any other wild creature. If its interests are to be protected someone has to be allowed to speak up on its behalf.

Walton v. The Scottish Ministers, Supreme Court (of UK), 17 October 2012, Judgment of Lord Hope, para. 152.

Dictum of the day, or on judicial regret

A Judge cannot but lament, when such cases as the present are brought into judgment. It is impossible that the reasons on which they go can be appreciated, but where institutions similar to our own, exist and are thoroughly understood. The struggle, too, in the Judge's own breast between the feelings of the man, and the duty of the magistrate is a severe one, presenting strong temptation to put aside such questions, if it be possible. It is useless however, to complain of things inherent in our political state. And it is criminal in a Court to avoid any responsibility which the laws impose. With whatever reluctance therefore it is done, the Court is compelled to express an opinion upon the extent of the dominion of the master over the slave in North-Carolina [...] The end is the profit of the master, his security and the public safety; the subject, one doomed in his own person, and his posterity, to live without knowledge, and without the capacity to make any thing his own, and to toil that another may reap the fruits. What moral considerations shall be addressed to such a being, to convince him what, it is impossible but that the most stupid must feel and know can never be true--that he is thus to labour upon a principle of natural duty, or for the sake of his own personal happiness, such services can only be expected from one who has no will of his own; who surrenders his will in implicit obedience to that of another. Such obedience is the consequence only of uncontrolled authority over the body. There is nothing else which can operate to produce the effect. The power of the master must be absolute, to render the submission of the slave perfect. I most freely confess my sense of the harshness of this proposition, I feel it as deeply as any man can. And as a principle of moral right, every person in his retirement must repudiate it. But in the actual condition of things, it must be so. There is no remedy. This discipline belongs to the state of slavery. They cannot be disunited, without abrogating at once the rights of the master, and absolving the slave from his subjection. It constitutes the curse of slavery to both the bond and free portions of our population. But it is inherent in the relation of master and slave.

North Carolina v. Mann 13 N.C. 263 (N.C. 1830), Opinion of Judge Ruffin

Dictum of the day, or on the heart of liberty

At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)

Dictum of the day, or on the salvation through activism

Nasuprot zakonodavcu, Ustavni sud, kao "čuvar Ustava", dužan je brinuti se za ostvarenje najviših vrednota ustavnog poretka Republike Hrvatske na način da posredstvom svojih posebnih institucionalnih ovlasti kompenzira slabosti nedostatno razvijene demokratske države utemeljene na proklamiranoj vladavini prava, što uključuje i njezin nedostatno razvijen i nesavršen pravni okvir. Rješavanjem složenih konflikata koji se javljaju u društvenom životu zajednice unutar nedostatno razvijenog i nesavršenog pravnog poretka, Ustavni sud ispunjava svoju ustavnu zadaću uravnoteživanja vrijednosno-normativnog i pozitivno-pravnog okvira države (...) Za buduće slučajeve to pitanje treba riješiti zakonodavac.

Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, U-VIIR-4696/2010, 20 October 2010, para. 25.1, 25.3