Dictum of the day, or fair nuff

[T]he use of imprecise legal concepts in making rules, breach of which entails the civil, administrative or even criminal liability of the person who contravenes them, does not mean that it is impossible to impose the remedial measures provided for by law, provided that the individual concerned is in a position, on the basis of the wording of the relevant provision and, if need be, with the help of the interpretation of it given by the courts, to know which acts or omissions will make him liable.

Case T-167/08, Microsoft v. European Comission, 22.06.2012, para. 84.

Dictum of the day, or on the arithmetic of constitutions

[C]onflict between convention and law which prevents the courts from enforcing conventions also prevents conventions from crystallizing into laws, unless it be by statutory adoption. It is because the sanctions of convention rest with institutions of government other than courts, such as the Governor General or the Lieutenant Governor, or the Houses of Parliament, or with public opinion and ultimately, with the electorate, that it is generally said that they are political [...] It should be borne in mind however that, while they are not laws, some conventions may be more important than some laws. Their importance depends on that of the value or principle which they are meant to safeguard. Also they form an integral part of the constitution and of the constitutional system. They come within the meaning of the word "Constitution" in the preamble of the British North America Act, 1867 [...] That is why it is perfectly appropriate to say that to violate a convention is to do something which is unconstitutional although it entails no direct legal consequence. But the words "constitu­tional" and "unconstitutional" may also be used in a strict legal sense, for instance with respect to a statute which is found ultra vires or unconstitu­tional. The foregoing may perhaps be summarized in an equation: constitutional conventions plus constitutional law equal the total constitution of the country.

Reference re Amendment of Constitution of Canada/Partition Reference, [1981] S.C.J. No. 58, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753 (S.C.C.), p. 883-884.

Dictum of the day, or on rejection of absurdity

It is further suggested that if the secession bid was successful, a new legal order would be created in that province, which would then be considered an independent state. Such a proposition is an assertion of fact, not a statement of law. It may or may not be true; in any event it is irrelevant to the questions of law before us. If, on the other hand, it is put forward as an assertion of law, then it simply amounts to the contention that the law may be broken as long as it can be broken successfully. Such a notion is contrary to the rule of law, and must be rejected.

Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 107-108.

Dictum of the day, or on the horrors of case-law

…this relentless search for eminently tangential case-law is as fruitful and fulfilling as trying to solve one crossword puzzle with the clues of another. The Court could, in my view, have started the exercise by accepting that this was judicial terra incognita, and could have worked out an organic doctrine of extra-territorial jurisdiction, untrammelled by the irrelevant and indifferent to the obfuscating.

Case of Al-Skeini and Others v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 55721/07, ECHR, Concurring opinion of Judge Bonello, para. 30.

Dictum of the day, or on the humans, consciense and the oblivion

One cannot build (and try to maintain) an international legal order over the suffering of human beings, over the silence of the innocent destined to oblivion (...) Above the will stands conscience, which is, after all, what moves the Law ahead, as its ultimate material source, removing manifest injustice.

Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy), International Court of Justice, GL No. 143, 6 July 2010, the Dissenting opinion of judge Antônio Augusto Cancado Trindade, para. 179

Trindade is safely metamorphosing into a full fledged l'enfant terrible of the international adjudication, combining academia and narcissism with genuine benevolence. A la new Weeramantry it would seem. Albeit mostly sound in reasoning such extrovert posture may lead to the characterization of human rights as a playground for eccentrics - though, sub sole nilhil novi est.

Dictum of the day, or on the seriousness of law

The other side has sought to create a great fog. If their view is right, even at this admissibility stage of proceedings you are being asked to express views on a wide range of exotic issues - erupting volcanoes, devastating floods, eighteenth century expeditions, disappearing islands, and so on and so forth. But we are not at the movies. We are before a court of law - the world’s principal judicial organ - and it is appropriate that we return to the real legal issues.

Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 September 1992 in the Case concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening) (El Salvador v. Honduras), Phillipe Sands, Oral Argument for Honduras, para. 3 (12.09.2003)